

# Adjusting to Economic Sanctions

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*Opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Banque de France or the Eurosystem*

## Summary of the paper

Impact of the Russia 2014+ ban on imports of agricultural and agro-food products from sanctioning countries on trade, labor and investment in firms' located in Lithuania

The reduced form (firm-level) estimation explores :

- the difference between “treated” and “matched controlled firms” in each year  $t$ ,
- the fraction of firm  $i$ 's sales of the banned products that is exported to Russia before 2014
- a post2014 dummy

The empirical approach accounts for dynamic adjustment (Post 2014 then Post 2016)

The paper develops a dynamic trade model with detailed structure on labor contracts (part time and full time workers) to rationalize the findings

# Summary of the paper

## **Main results :**

- Part time labor adjusted mostly in the first period, while full time employment adjusted in the 2016-2017 period only.
- Negative effect on investment as well but mostly in the first period
- Some evidence of rising exports to third countries after 2016

## **Overall comment :**

- Very interesting paper given the large size of the shock for Lithuania : in 2020, Russia was still the first trading partner of Lithuania with about 13% of its total exports !
- Very interesting investigation on the reaction of affected firms via labor adjustment (part time / full time) while other papers have mainly focused on trade adjustment and implied welfare losses (Crozet and Hinz, 2020, Economic Policy)

## Comments on the empirical methodology (1/2)

Main empirical specification :

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \beta_1 \text{BannedExportShare}_i \times \text{Post2014}_t + \gamma_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

$\Delta$  is the different in year t and outcome Y between firm i and a “matched control firm” , same sector, same size, but not exporting to Russia

- Who are these firms? Given the proximity to the Russian market, every exporter in the food industry should export to Russia. Non-exporters to Russia may have very different characteristics and therefore do not necessarily represent a very good match.
- How many control firms? In total, 151 observations in each estimation. With 7 years of observations this makes about 21 firms per year which is not huge for identification (especially with interaction terms)
- Control firms not directly affected but they could also be indirectly impacted due to GE effects with changes in the prices ( $\downarrow$ ) for targeted products

## Comments on the empirical methodology (2/2)

- An other problem may come from the presence of wholesalers or intermediaries, which may suffer from a drop in exports but not necessarily in labor. Could drop these firms.
- Export reallocation matters only after 2016 apparently. Where did the missing exports (non-storable production) go? Domestic market? Impact on prices?
- Why not taking logs for the dependent variable?
- Estimate the impact using event-year dummies rather than using 2 dummies with non-exclusive period

## Labor market adjustments

- Is part time work force necessarily more flexible labor in your data ?
- Was there any scheme introduced to facilitate labor adjustment, like partial unemployment associated with public subsidies ?
- Adjustment of part time vs full time changes over time, but this is not a single shock in 2014+. Multiple shocks could generate as well this adjustment on the labor over time (+implementation of policies)

## Comments on theory

- Motivate more why a theoretical framework is needed, as the question looks more like an empirical / quantitative
- Is it possible to calibrate the model to go more quantitative with simulations (new sanctions, Covid...)?
- On the mechanisms, unclear whether GE effects are accounted for.
- Reallocation of exports across markets : Can be obtained with convex unit production costs (check out Antras et al “Venting out” paper, AER 2021)