



Benchmarking the MW (1)




Benchmarking the MW (2)




Benchmarking the MW(3)


Labour productivity per hour worked and real MW (1983=100)




Benchmarking the MW (4)




But TFP may just be a measure of our ignorance...




Benchmarking (5): Nominal MW levels in 2012



Benchmarking (6): MW in PPS, 2012



Benchmarking (7): MW/AW ratio, 2011




*BE, FR, NL, RO, TR: 2010. BG: provisional. BE, EL: B-S without section O.

Benchmarking (8): MW bargains provide the benchmark for sectoral wage bargains




Benchmarking (9): 21% of private-sector workers were earning less than the MW in 2006 (possibly 15% being full-time workers)

Distribution of monthly earnings of insured (IKA) population in 2006, MW=€717



*“How do we know that MWs are high?”,
or, the tyranny of a diagram*



- The meaning of the firm's labour demand curve (Patinkin, 1956)) can be understood by conducting the conceptual experiment of confronting a perfectly competitive firm with a particular value of the (real)wage rate, and asking it to designate (subject to its production function) the amount of labour that it wishes to employ. By repeating this conceptual experiment with different values of wages, we obtain the firm's "labour demand curve".
- Then, by a "sleight of hand", we sum over all the firms in the economy and we call the resulting thing the "**aggregate** labour demand curve".
- What's wrong with this procedure?
- Although a perfectly competitive firm can sell as much as it wishes at any wage-price combination, this can not be true of the economy as a whole ...
- Yet, in constructing the "**aggregate** labour demand curve", this is what has been implicitly assumed.
- This issue loses its force in the context of a small country facing a perfectly elastic product demand curve from the rest of the world.

“Theory” imposes no constraints on the evolution of factor shares

- With C-D technology, the MP product of labour is proportional to the AP. Perfect competition (in both goods and labour markets) implies that labour productivity and real (product) wages should move in tandem - labour’s share stays constant.
- In general, the labour share (under perfect competition and CRS technology) is a function of the capital-output ratio,
e.g. with a CES technology, $Y = [\alpha(AK)^\rho + (1 - \alpha)(BL)^\rho]^{1/\rho}$,
 $S_L = 1 - \alpha(Ak)^\rho$, where k is the capital-output ratio.
- The elasticity of substitution, $\sigma = 1/(1-\rho)$, is thus key for determining how the labour share responds to changes in k .
- Nevertheless, “theory” provides little guidance since:
 - (i) The capital-augmenting technical progress coefficient (A) need not be constant
 - (ii) for more general production functions the labour share/capital-output ratio relationship is not monotonic
 - (iii) the relationship between σ and the labour share breaks down if production requires imported intermediate inputs (III); the labour share is now affected by the relative price of III, but not in a monotonic way
 - (iv) changes away from the competitive paradigm (e.g. unions, efficiency wages) complicate the issue further


Impacts : Low-wage employment

Gender-wage differentials and low-wage workers, 2002-2006

Year	Average Monthly Wage in € (Annual/12)	Men's Average in €(Annual/12)	Women's Average in €(Annual/12)	Percentage Women's/ Men's average wage	Percentage of low-wage workers (2/3 of average wage)
2002	848	952	718	75%	24%
2003	917	1.047	760	73%	37%
2004	980	1.110	821	74%	39%
2005	1.019	1.157	856	74%	35%
2006	1.062	1.203	900	75%	31%


Impacts: Unemployment Rates

Unemployment rates by age and gender




Impacts: Employment Rates

Employment rates by age and gender




Impacts : Gender-related unemployment and average wages


Female to male wage and unemployment ratio (2002-2006, averages)




Impacts: Gender-Related wage ratios across regions (2002-2006 averages)



Impact: Gender-related wage and unemployment relativities across regions (2002-2006 averages)




Impacts: MW/AW ratio and the ratio of the age-related unemployment rates (15-24/25-64), 2002-2006 averages




Impacts-Sectoral (1)

Ratio of MW to compensation per employee




Impacts-Sectoral (2)

TEXTILES: hours, employment, and labour claims




Impacts-Sectoral (3)

ELECTR. AND OPTICAL EQUIPM.: hours, employment, and labour claims




Impacts-Sectoral (3)

FOOD, BEVERAGES, & TOBACCO: hours, employment, and labour claims




Impacts-Sectoral (4)

WHOLESALE & RETAIL TRADE: hours, employment, and labour claims




Impacts-Sectoral (5)

FINANCE & BUSIN. SERVICES: hours, employment, and labour claims




Impacts: Cross-country comparisons (1)

Textiles, 1995 - 2006




Impacts: Cross-country comparisons (2)

Electrical & Optical Equipment, 1995 - 2006




Impacts: Cross-country comparisons (3)

Food - Beverages - Tobacco , 1995 - 2006




Impacts: International (1)

Evolution of shares of world exports (goods and services), 1994=100




Impacts: International (2)

Evolution of shares of world exports (goods only), 2002=100



Impacts: International (3)

Relative unit labour costs and relative export prices, 2005=1



Concluding Remarks

- It is not evident that the evolution of MWs is responsible for the deterioration in the “competitiveness” of the Greek economy until 2008
- The unsustainable current account deficits since the mid-1990s have been the result of growth-on-(credit) steroids , which was due to large government budget deficits and bank-mediated excessive credit creation through foreign borrowing