

Post-crisis Challenges for the Economies of SEE

Economic governance in EMU

Recent reforms and their significance for
existing and prospective members

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1. Causes of the sovereign debt crisis and implications for EMU

- The global crisis affected most economies
 - And exposed the fragilities of economies with serious imbalances and structural weaknesses.
- Sovereign crisis in GR, IR, P: differences and common factors
 - Greece and Portugal: Inadequate fiscal adjustment and high government debt (especially Greece), loss of competitiveness.
 - Ireland: overinvestment in real estate, fragile financial sector

2. Policy implications for EMU

- The sovereign debt crisis was transformed into a systemic problem for the euro area
 - Risk to financial stability for the EA as a whole
 - A test for institutions, mechanisms, instruments

- Current events in historical perspective
 - A flavour of the 1992 EMS crisis
 - Differences
 - Then: simple monetary arrangements
 - Now: a fully fledged monetary union
 - Common element
 - need for adaptations and reform

3. Response to the crisis in three directions:

- Immediate measures to contain the impact of the crisis
 - The paradox of the “missing mechanism”
 - Financial support and adjustment schemes
- Decision to set up a permanent crisis management framework
 - European Stability Mechanism
- Strengthening economic governance
 - New architecture for policy coordination
 - Stricter fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance
 - New instruments to ensure financial stability

4. Establishment and activation of financial support mechanisms

- Ad hoc EA-IMF financial support to Greece
 - € 110 billion 3-year loan (extended to 7.5 yrs)
 - Strict economic conditionality (EC,IMF,ECB)
- European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
 - € 440 billion (up from €250 billion initially)
 - Strict economic conditionality (EC,IMF,ECB)
- European Finan. Stabilisation Mechanism
 - €60 billion loans guaranteed by EU budget
 - Strict economic conditionality (EC,IMF,ECB)

5. Financial support to Ireland – Request for support by Portugal

- €80 billion EU/IMF loan to Ireland
 - From the EFSF, the EFSM, the IMF, bilateral loans (UK, DK, SWE) and Irish Fund
 - Strong conditionality (EC, IMF, ECB)
 - Special provisions for the financial sector
- Request for financial support by Portugal
 - Ongoing negotiations on loan conditions
 - €80 billion a first estimate of the loan
 - Strict economic conditionality

6. A permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from June 2013

- To provide financial assistance to EA countries facing severe financing problems
 - Limited treaty modification (art. 136) to establish a mechanism “to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole”.
- €500 billion effective lending capacity.
 - Loans to be provided under strict conditionality. Exceptionally the ESM may intervene in the primary debt markets.
- Possibility for private sector involvement
 - depending on the outcome of debt sustainability analysis.

7. Strengthening Economic Governance I

- The “European Semester”
 - A new architecture for economic governance
 - Ex ante coordination to provide guidance
 - Unified coordination to create synergies
- Procedure
 - Annual Growth Survey by the EC (January)
 - Debate and orientations by the EU Council, EP, European Council (March-April)
 - Adoption of national SCPs and NRPs (May)
 - Policy Guidance by EU Council (June-July)
 - Decisions at national level (Autumn)

8.Strengthening economic governance II

- Improving fiscal surveillance
 - Strengthening the SGP
 - Tighter monitoring, quantified reduction of gov. debt, more automatic sanctions- reverse QMV
 - National fiscal frameworks
 - Fostering national ownership, strengthening national structures for budgetary discipline
- Preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances
 - Early detection of imbalances (also ESRB role)
 - Excessive Imbalance Position

9.Strengthening economic governance III

- The “Euro plus Pact”
 - To strengthen the economic pillar of EMU by enhancing competitiveness and convergence
 - Focus on areas of national competence
 - EU fiscal rules into national legislation
- EU Financial sector reform – a European System of Financial Supervision
 - European Systemic Risk Board
 - European Banking, Insurance and Securities authorities

10. “Europe 2020” Growth Strategy

- “Europe 2020” is the EU’s growth strategy for the coming decade (replaced Lisbon Strategy).
- Five objectives to be reached by 2020:
 - Promoting employment (employment rate to 75%), innovation (R&D 3% of GDP) and social inclusion, improving education levels, meeting climate change and energy objectives.
 - Key role for the Single Market to promote competitiveness and deliver growth and employment
 - Implementation through National Reform Programmes prepared by Member States

11. Preliminary assessment of reforms

- Greater coherence in economic governance: macro, fiscal, financial
 - Macro surveillance: the main new element
 - Ownership of new fiscal rules by MS essential
 - Financial stability: central role for the ECB
 - Financial support avoiding moral hazard
 - implications of private sector involvement
- Ok for stability, what about Growth
 - Focus on stability fully justified
 - However, growth initiatives indispensable
 - "Europe 2020" more focused than "Lisbon"
 - Single Market initiative, Project Bond Initiative

12. Importance of economic governance reforms for prospective members I

- A well-functioning EMU beneficial for all
 - a factor of stability and prosperity for main economic partners
- Fiscal and macro rules apply in general to all EU members
 - Approved by Ecofin, negotiations with EP
 - ECB asked for stricter rules for EA countries
- Euro convergence criteria: no change
 - Sustainability more important than ever

13. Significance of EconGov reforms for prospective members II

- Euro plus Pact: important for prospective emu members
 - Joined the Pact: BU, DK, LA, LI, PO, RO
 - Substance: useful in preparing for emu
 - In form: message of commitment to emu
- Lessons from the global-sovereign crisis
 - Central and SEECs showed resilience to shocks
 - Low public debt helped
 - Caution: important to maintain the cap

14. EMU beyond the sovereign crisis I

- EMU remains an attractive project
 - Estonia fulfilled convergence criteria and joined the euro area on 1.1.2011
 - Most non-members wish to join “as soon as possible”
- Improved overall performance and both higher convergence and persistent imbalances in the EA until the global crisis
 - Plus: overall price stability, 16 million jobs created (more than in the US), convergence in real GDP per head, balanced external accounts.
 - Minus: competitiveness losses, fiscal and CA imbalances, diverging inflation rates

15. EMU beyond the sovereign crisis II

- There is nothing irreversible in the present difficulties in several euro area economies
 - There is no “inherent tendency” to low growth in the economies concerned. Evidence shows the contrary.
 - Real interest rates and perceived protection provided by the euro led to “reform and adjustment inertia”.
 - New EU rules and instruments will encourage reforms, enhance productivity, competitiveness and balanced growth in a more stable framework.
 - With strong commitment to adjustment and reform and a more sustainable growth model these economies can be the winners of the growth game in the next decades.