Speech and presentation by the Bank of Greece Governor Yannis Stournaras at the “2026 Money and Banking Conference – Growth, Productivity & Inflation” by the Banco Central de la República Argentina
17/11/2026 - Speeches
Panel Discussion: Experiences in Economic Development: Greece and Australia - The impact of Monetary Stability on Private Investment: Deregulation, Resource Reallocation, and Potential Economic Growth
Speaker: Yannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece
Moderators: Santiago Bausili, Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina and Vladimir Werning, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina
Speech: “Monetary Stability, Domestic Confidence and Investment: The Greek Experience”
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to join you in Buenos Aires to discuss how monetary stability can support private investment and sustained growth. I would like to thank the Central Bank of Argentina for the invitation.
I will focus on the policies that supported Greece’s recovery and the challenges that remain. I will begin with the disruption to financing conditions during the Greek sovereign debt crisis, before turning to macroeconomic adjustment and the rebuilding of domestic confidence. Next, I will discuss the interaction between European solidarity and national responsibility – a central feature of Europe’s response to the crisis. I will then turn to banking sector restructuring and its role in restoring lending capacity. Finally, I will examine how reforms and productive investment can improve resource allocation, raise productivity and potential growth, and support income convergence. I will conclude with lessons that may be relevant for Argentina.
1. A common monetary anchor, a domestic credit crunch
Monetary stability is a key prerequisite for investment and economic prosperity. By safeguarding price stability and anchoring inflation expectations, monetary policy reduces uncertainty. In normal times, lower financing costs and higher asset valuations relative to the cost of new capital encourage investment, while stronger balance sheets facilitate access to credit. During a crisis, however, falling asset values and weaker balance sheets can tighten financing conditions and amplify the contraction in investment, even as monetary policy seeks to support the economy.
Greece’s experience shows why monetary stability must be supported by credible domestic policies and institutions. Euro area membership provided a reliable monetary anchor. Yet it did not prevent the accumulation of fiscal and external imbalances or ensure that capital flowed to its most productive uses. When the crisis erupted, rising sovereign risk premia and financial distress disrupted the transmission of monetary policy to the Greek economy.
A single monetary policy did not ensure identical, union-wide financing conditions. During the crisis, the Eurosystem’s monetary accommodative monetary policy helped contain financing pressures. Nevertheless, Greek firms faced borrowing costs above the euro area average (left-hand chart), while bank lending to businesses contracted for several years (right-hand chart). The contraction reflected both constraints on credit supply and the recession’s effects on credit demand and borrowers’ creditworthiness. These adverse domestic financing conditions limited the support that monetary easing could provide for investment in Greece.
Restoring confidence in Greece’s continued membership in the euro area was essential to economic recovery. After the eruption of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2009, sovereign stress weakened banks, while fears of a euro exit and the redenomination of contracts in a new currency fuelled deposit outflows. Capital controls were introduced in June 2015 to contain outflows, while restrictions on cross-border payments limited firms’ access to imported inputs. Uncertainty over financing and future returns led firms to postpone or cancel investment plans. Overcoming these pressures required credible domestic policies and restructuring of the financial sector, alongside official financial assistance and Eurosystem support that helped avert an even deeper contraction in economic activity.
2. Domestic confidence and macroeconomic adjustment
For Greece, restoring fiscal credibility was essential to rebuilding that confidence. The structural primary balance, which adjusts for the economic cycle and one-off measures, illustrates both the scale and the persistence of the fiscal adjustment. It moved from a deficit of 13% of potential GDP in 2009 to a surplus of 2% in 2012, reaching almost 6% in 2016 (left-hand chart). This underlying adjustment helped turn large headline and primary deficits into surpluses (right-hand chart). Maintaining a stronger underlying fiscal position over successive years helped reassure investors that Greece’s fiscal improvement would endure.
Structural reforms to public spending and tax administration can make fiscal adjustment more durable. By addressing the underlying sources of long-term spending pressure, well-designed expenditure reforms can generate lasting savings, reduce the need for higher tax rates and create room for productive investment. Successive pension reforms consolidated social security funds, harmonised benefit rules and tightened early retirement provisions. In health care, electronic prescribing and tighter controls on pharmaceutical expenditure strengthened the monitoring and spending management. A unified public-sector wage framework, tighter payroll controls and recruitment limits helped contain the wage bill. These expenditure reforms were complemented by an overhaul of tax administration. The establishment of an independent revenue authority, together with the wider use of digital reporting, electronic payments and targeted audits, strengthened tax compliance and the capacity to tackle evasion. These reforms generated lasting revenue gains, creating scope for productive public investment and a lower tax burden on compliant taxpayers.
Fiscal balance has been restored, but the external deficit remains a source of vulnerability. Unlike before the crisis, the current account deficit is no longer accompanied by a large fiscal deficit. Part of the external imbalance reflects higher imports of inputs and capital goods due to the recovery in output and investment. However, heavy reliance on imports and insufficient domestic saving remain structural weaknesses.
The composition of external financing has also shifted towards direct investment. Net direct investment inflows covered around half of the current account deficit in 2025, compared with about 4% in 2008. Before the crisis, external financing relied heavily on debt inflows, including foreign purchases of government securities and funding to banks. Direct investment is generally more stable, so its larger contribution can reduce vulnerability to abrupt reversals in capital flows.
Nevertheless, the economy remains dependent on external financing. Lasting correction requires stronger domestic saving and productive investment that expands exports and supports competitive import substitution.
Greece’s sovereign debt crisis and its path back to investment grade demonstrates both how quickly credibility can be lost and how slowly it is restored. The sharp ratings downgrades at the beginning of the crisis were followed by a much longer process of recovery. Greece lost investment-grade status in 2010 and did not begin regaining until 2023, while its current ratings remain below pre-crisis levels. The recent upgrades reflected years of improvement in public finances and economic performance, together with greater confidence that sound policies and reforms would be sustained. Investment grade broadens the investor base and can improve financing terms for the government, banks and businesses, supporting productive investment. The central lesson is that credibility is rebuilt through a record of consistent implementation and delivery on commitments over time.
Preserving that credibility requires domestic ownership of reforms and policy consistency. In Greece, political fragmentation and resistance to change delayed implementation and prolonged uncertainty, weakening social cohesion. Intense confrontation over programme commitments fuelled doubts about policy continuity and, ultimately, Greece’s membership in the euro area. Ownership requires political leaders to explain why reforms are necessary, build support for their objectives and take responsibility for delivering them, backed by effective institutions. A fair distribution of adjustment costs also contributes to public acceptance. Broad political consensus on key reform objectives helps maintain continuity across changes in government, reducing the risk of policy reversals. Political stability and predictable policies are particularly valuable when the external environment is uncertain. Firms need confidence in the economic policy framework to make long-term investment commitments.
These domestic efforts were reinforced by European support. This interaction between European solidarity and national responsibility was central to Greece’s economic recovery.
3. European solidarity and national responsibility
European solidarity helped Greece undertake painful adjustment within the monetary union. Our European partners provided loans with exceptionally long maturities and favourable interest rate terms, subsequently reinforced by debt-relief measures. These arrangements eased debt-servicing and refinancing pressures, giving Greece time to address its imbalances. In return, Greece undertook commitments to restore fiscal sustainability, restructure its banking system and implement structural reforms. Thus, European solidarity and national responsibility reinforced each other: concessional financing terms made the adjustment more manageable, while implementation of the agreed reforms was essential to restoring confidence and regaining sustainable access to market financing.
Greece’s debt outlook illustrates the lasting benefits of combining European solidarity with national responsibility. The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to remain on a broadly downward path under the baseline and in all the adverse scenarios considered, including those assuming weaker primary balances, slower growth and higher financing costs (left-hand chart). This resilience reflects Greece’s strong underlying fiscal position, together with the favourable structure of its debt. Long maturities and concessional financing terms help contain debt-servicing costs and refinancing risks. Effective debt management, including early repayments of official loans and interest rate hedging, further helps manage financing costs and reduce exposure to interest rate risk. Together, these factors make the debt trajectory more resilient to adverse macroeconomic, fiscal and financial developments.
The favourable characteristics of public debt cushion the transmission of higher market interest rates to debt-servicing costs. With a weighted average maturity of around 18 years and fully fixed-rate exposure after hedging, increases in market rates feed through only gradually to debt-servicing costs. The projections shown illustrate this protection: Greece’s implicit interest rate – which is the average interest rate on outstanding debt – increases gradually and remains below those of the other European high-debt countries.
The Eurosystem played a critical role by supporting bank liquidity and safeguarding monetary policy transmission. During the adjustment programmes, the ECB introduced a waiver allowing securities issued or guaranteed by the Greek government to remain eligible as collateral in Eurosystem refinancing operations even if they fell below the usual minimum credit-rating threshold. This waiver was linked to satisfactory programme implementation. Moreover, the Securities Markets Programme helped restore the functioning of impaired sovereign bond markets. Alongside these measures, longer-term refinancing operations, broader collateral eligibility and liquidity provision at fixed rates with full allotment helped banks meet their funding needs when private financing markets were severely impaired. Together, these interventions, in an environment of very low – even negative – policy rates, helped ease liquidity pressures and limit the spillover of sovereign stress to the financing of the real economy.
As pressures intensified, the Bank of Greece played a central role in ensuring the continuous provision of liquidity to eligible credit institutions. (left-hand chart) Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) became increasingly important as deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness and changes in collateral eligibility constrained access to regular Eurosystem funding, while persistent deposit outflows increased banks’ liquidity needs. This support helped avert a disorderly contraction of the banking system, contain the risk of bank runs and dampen the decline in credit to households and firms. As confidence returned, deposits recovered and market access improved, reducing reliance on central-bank financing. These developments also enabled the gradual relaxation of capital controls and their full removal in September 2019.
During the pandemic, the Eurosystem demonstrated again that its instruments could respond flexibly to exceptional risks to monetary policy transmission. (right-hand chart) Greek government bonds were included in the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) even though Greece had not yet regained investment-grade status. Substantial purchases of Greek government bonds helped contain financing pressures and support the Greek economy during a global shock, well before Greece began regaining investment-grade status in 2023. More broadly, the PEPP’s flexibility in allocating purchases across countries helped prevent tensions in individual sovereign debt markets from disrupting the transmission of the single monetary policy across the euro area.
The European lesson is that a common currency must be supported by credible national policies and effective common institutions. National policies must address fiscal and structural weaknesses, while European institutions must be equipped to manage crises and safeguard financial stability and effective monetary policy transmission. Eurosystem instruments need to be flexible, supported by sound risk controls and credit assessments that go beyond mechanical reliance on external ratings. These efforts help prevent financial disruption from undermining domestic adjustment and support predictable financing conditions for long-term investment, while allowing borrowing costs to reflect differences in credit risk.
Turning these improvements in financing conditions into productive investment also required a stronger banking system. This brings me to the restructuring of Greece’s financial sector and its role in supporting recovery and investment.
4. Restructuring the banking system to support productive investment
Restoring banks’ capacity to finance the economy required rebuilding capital and repairing loan portfolios. The sovereign debt restructuring in 2012 imposed heavy losses on Greek banks, while the prolonged recession weakened borrowers’ repayment capacity and led to a sharp rise in non-performing loans. In turn, banking distress constrained credit and deepened the recession, while public support for recapitalisation added to government borrowing needs. Central bank liquidity support helped banks withstand funding pressures, but restoring their capacity to finance the recovery also required a comprehensive approach aimed at recognising losses, restoring solvency and repairing loan portfolios.
Restructuring, consolidation and recapitalisation laid the foundations for a more resilient banking system. The Bank of Greece led an extensive restructuring and consolidation process. Non-viable institutions were resolved through a good-/bad-bank framework. Performing assets and deposits were transferred to viable institutions, while residual impaired assets were placed under special liquidation. This process protected depositors from losses and helped preserve financial stability. Moreover, domestic banks acquired Greek subsidiaries and operations of several foreign banking groups. As a result, the sector consolidated around four systemic institutions. Public resources together with private investment, financed successive rounds of recapitalisation.
Reducing the large stock of NPLs required specialised expertise, operational capacity, clear objectives and effective supervision. The Bank of Greece required banks to establish dedicated units to manage these loans and adopt credible NPL reduction strategies. It also worked with ECB Banking Supervision to set and monitor operational targets, while early-warning systems helped identify emerging repayment difficulties. The development of a market for distressed loans and a specialised servicing industry provided additional capacity to restructure loans and recover outstanding debts.
The “Hercules” Asset Protection Scheme enabled Greece to tackle legacy NPLs on a large scale. Introduced in late 2019, it facilitated NPL securitisations by providing state guarantees on senior notes, while higher-risk tranches were transferred to private investors. Specialised credit servicing firms took over the management of the underlying loans. Together, these arrangements accelerated the removal of impaired assets from banks’ balance sheets.
Healthier loan portfolios and stronger capital positions helped restore banks’ lending capacity. Banks’ NPL ratio fell from around 49% to almost 3% (left-hand chart), approaching European levels, while their total capital ratio recovered to around 20% (right-hand chart). The clean-up involved recognising losses, while recapitalisation and subsequent retained earnings helped rebuild capital buffers.
Repairing banks’ balance sheets does not, however, resolve all distressed debt in the economy. Between 2016 and 2026, the stock of NPLs on bank balance sheets fell by around 94%, while the total stock of non-performing private-sector debt declined by around 30%. Much of the remaining stock is managed by specialised credit servicing firms, outside the banking system. Transferring a loan changes the creditor, but does not, by itself, reduce the borrower’s debt burden or restore their capacity to invest.
Effective debt resolution is therefore essential for investment and efficient reallocation of resources. Sustainable restructuring can help viable firms regain access to finance and resume investment. For non-viable businesses, timely insolvency procedures can release assets for more productive uses. Greece has significantly strengthened its restructuring and insolvency framework. Electronic auction platforms have been introduced, the servicing industry has matured and the available restructuring tools are substantially stronger than they were during the crisis. Nevertheless, delays in the judicial system remain an important constraint. Efficient courts, capable servicers and workable solutions for cooperative borrowers are necessary to translate financial-sector repair into broader economic gains.
Effective supervision and macroprudential policies are essential to preserve these gains and safeguard financial stability. Recognising losses early and taking timely corrective action help contain financial distress. Building capital buffers when conditions allow and maintaining prudent lending standards help limit risks across the financial system and prevent today’s credit expansion becoming tomorrow’s distressed debt.
A stronger banking system must go hand in hand with reforms that expand the opportunities for productive investment. I will now examine how deregulation and complementary reforms can improve resource allocation and raise the economy’s growth potential.
5. From stabilisation to productive investment, higher potential growth and convergence
Reducing regulatory barriers and increasing labour market flexibility were essential to creating opportunities for productive investment. Successive reforms simplified business licensing and start-up procedures, eased restrictions in regulated professions and reduced administrative burdens, including through the digitalisation of public services. By 2023, Greece’s product market regulation indicator was close to the OECD average (left-hand chart). Employment protection rules had also become less stringent (right-hand chart). By lowering the cost of market entry and expanding production, these reforms strengthen incentives to invest and innovate and help capital and labour move towards more productive activities.
The sequencing and coordination of reforms matter for both their effectiveness and their social acceptance. In Greece, labour market adjustment proceeded faster than reforms to strengthen competition in goods and services markets. This limited the transmission of lower labour costs to prices, exacerbating the loss of household purchasing power and weakening domestic demand. Product and services market reforms should therefore precede, or at least accompany, reforms that increase labour market flexibility.
Internal devaluation helped Greece recoup the cost competitiveness lost before the crisis. Without the option of devaluing a national currency, Greece had to restore price and cost competitiveness through nominal wage cuts and adjustments in domestic prices relative to those of its trading partners. (left-hand chart) Unit labour costs declined markedly relative to those of our euro area trading partners. The swift recovery in cost competitiveness came at a substantial economic and social cost: nominal wages fell faster than prices, eroding household purchasing power and depressing consumption. Fiscal consolidation and tighter credit conditions compounded these effects. Looking ahead, sustained competitiveness gains must increasingly be driven by higher productivity, enabling firms to be internationally competitive while supporting rising real wages.
The economic and social costs of the crisis and the overall adjustment were also reflected in the sharp rise in unemployment. (right-hand chart) Unemployment reached almost 28% in 2013, with youth unemployment approaching 60%. However, as the recovery gathered pace, unemployment declined markedly, helped by reforms that improved labour market functioning. By 2025, unemployment had fallen to around 9% and youth unemployment to around 19%, substantially narrowing the gap with the euro area average. Sustaining these gains requires better matching of skills with firms’ needs, effective training and fewer barriers to labour force participation.
Greece has also become more export-oriented. (left-hand chart) Exports of goods and services increased from around one-fifth of GDP in the early 2000s to approximately two-fifths in recent years. The challenge that lies ahead is to consolidate this shift by broadening the range of internationally competitive goods and services and increasing the domestic value added generated by exports. A stronger and more diversified export base can create opportunities for productive investment, support more sustainable growth and reduce external vulnerabilities.
Greater export orientation has been accompanied by stronger activity in sectors with higher productivity, such as manufacturing and ICT. (right-hand chart) Real gross value added in both sectors has expanded markedly since 2019, substantially outpacing growth in the economy as a whole.
This shift in Greece’s production base came with a remarkable turnaround in investment since 2019. (left-hand chart) Gross fixed capital formation increased from around 11% of GDP in 2019 to approximately 18% in 2025, reducing the gap with the euro area by more than half. Sustaining this momentum is essential to overcome the legacy of prolonged underinvestment, rebuild the capital stock and upgrade the technologies used in production.
Beyond the recovery in total investment, its composition has shifted towards assets that can strengthen productive capacity. (right-hand chart) Between 2007 and 2025, the combined share of equipment and intellectual property products rose from just over one-third to more than half of total investment. The share of intellectual property products, including R&D, software and databases, nearly tripled, while housing’s share more than halved. This investment mix offers greater scope for productivity gains, provided that projects are well selected and effectively implemented.
European solidarity has supported this shift towards productive investment by combining common financing with national reforms. The European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was established in response to the COVID-19 crisis, providing grants and loans financed through common European borrowing. Greece has the largest allocation relative to GDP and has been among the leading countries in securing disbursements through the fulfilment of agreed reform and investment milestones. The RRF loan segment has also mobilised substantial private investment by combining European funding with bank lending and firms’ own resources. The national plan brings together investments in infrastructure, skills and the green and digital transitions with reforms to improve the business environment and public administration. This combination can generate lasting productivity gains beyond the initial boost to demand, offering a valuable model for future European initiatives to address shared challenges.
The recovery in Greece’s estimated potential growth highlights the importance of both rebuilding capital and using resources more productively. (left-hand chart) The decomposition shows that capital accumulation is contributing positively again after a prolonged negative contribution, while total factor productivity has become the largest contributor to potential growth. Productivity gains can arise from the adoption of new technologies and more efficient production processes, as well as from the reallocation of capital and labour towards more productive activities. Labour has also supported the recovery, but population ageing is projected to turn its contribution negative towards the end of this decade. Sustaining growth will therefore depend increasingly on investment and productivity improvements, backed by reforms that facilitate resource reallocation and raise labour force participation.
Despite the improvement in potential growth, Greece’s labour productivity relative to the euro area suggests that substantial challenges remain. (right-hand chart) Real output per hour worked has improved recently but remains below its pre-crisis level, while the euro area has recorded cumulative gains. This divergence underscores the importance of translating the investment recovery into sustained productivity gains that support higher wages and income convergence towards the euro area average.
Overall, the recovery has strengthened the economy, but the income losses of the crisis have not yet been fully reversed. (left-hand chart) At their lowest points during the crisis, real GDP per capita had fallen by around 26% and real household disposable income per capita by around 36% from their pre-crisis levels. These were losses on a scale usually associated with wartime. Both remain below those levels today, reflecting the exceptional depth and duration of the downturn. (right-hand chart) Greece also remains below its pre-crisis position relative to the EU average, as do other crisis-affected economies such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. Renewed convergence therefore requires real incomes per capita to grow faster than the EU average on a sustained basis.
What distinguishes Greece’s recovery today are the stronger economic foundations on which it rests. Before the crisis, higher income levels partly reflected an unsustainable pattern of growth. Rapid credit expansion fuelled domestic demand, alongside large fiscal and external deficits, while wages grew faster than productivity, eroding competitiveness. Today, public finances and banks are on a sounder footing, cost competitiveness has improved, and investment and exports play a greater role in the economy. These changes provide a firmer basis for sustainable convergence. Continued reforms and productive investment remain essential to translate these stronger foundations into lasting productivity gains and higher real incomes.
6. Concluding remarks: lessons for sustained investment and growth
To conclude, Greece’s experience shows that monetary stability, credible domestic policies and sustained reforms must work together to support productive investment and lasting growth. Fiscal responsibility and policy continuity give businesses confidence that progress will endure
Stronger confidence and better access to finance must translate into investment that raises productivity. Sound banks support new investment, while effective debt resolution helps viable firms recover and releases resources for more productive uses. Competition, skills development and technology adoption help firms expand productive capacity.
Greece’s experience also shows how external support can reinforce domestic efforts when combined with national responsibility. European solidarity provided financing and time for reforms and investment to deliver results. Domestic reform commitments and their implementation were essential to making that support effective.
Finally, domestic ownership and public support are essential to sustain reform. Effective institutions, consistent implementation and a fair distribution of adjustment costs help maintain that support.
For Argentina, the shared challenge is to turn stabilisation into sustained investment and higher productivity. Our institutional settings may differ, but the need to build confidence that progress will last is common. Ultimately, success will be measured by the economy’s ability to generate productive employment, higher real incomes and lasting economic prosperity.
Thank you.